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My  pur~ose is to  discuss  the  relationship between  domestic 
macro-economic  policies  designed_ to maintain  "full employment"  without 
a  runaway  inflation  and  international  financial  institutions and  policies 
designed  to facilitate  these  domestic  objectives,  with  the  special pur-
~ose of  discussing  the  problems  which  arise for  a  limited group  of  co-
operating  countries  such  as  the  EEC. 
For  some  quarter  of  a  century after  World  War  Two  we  accepted,  at 
least  in  the  United  Kingdom,  what  I  may  call  the  philosophy  of  Orthodox 
Keynesianism.  It  was  regarded  as  a  function  of  government  to devise  its 
financial  policies -fiscal, monetary,  and  foreign  exchange  rate policies 
- so  as  to  maintain total  money  expenditures  on,  and  thus  the  demand  for, 
the  products  of  Labour  at  whatever  Level  was  necessary  to maintain 
"full  employment".  The  effect  of  the  public  recognition  of  this  govern-
mental  obligation to  maintain  full  employment  together  with  the  building 
of  a  humane  welfare  state,  designed  to mitigate the  hardships  due  to 
unemployment  and  other  causes  of  poverty,  was  destined  ultimately to 
lead  to  the threat  of  a  runaway  explosive  inflation,  so  long  as  money 
wage  rates  continued  to  be  set  by  a  process  of  Free  Collective  Bargaining 
or  of  what  I  prefer to  call  Uncontrolled  Monopoly  Bargaining.  The  Welfare 
State  made  people  Less  frightened  of  unemployment;  the  government  obliga-
tion to  expand  money  expenditures  so  as  to maintain  full  employment  made 
overambitious  wage  claims  by  monopolistic  unions  more  insistent,  since 
the  fear  of  adverse  effects  on  jobs  was  reduced;  employers  were  more 
willing  to grant  wage  increases  since  they  expected  in  general  that  money 
expenditures  would  be  expanded  sufficiently to  cover  increased  costs; 
this  meant  that  they  did  not  hesitate  to  raise selling prices  to  cover 
costs;  and  the  consequent  increase  in  the  cost  of  living  led  to further 
increases  in  wage  claims  with  the  threat  of  a  vicious  spiral  of  runaway 
inflation  so  long  as  real  demands  were  in  excess  of  real  productivity. 
There  were  rumblings  of  this  throughout  the  1950s-60s  with  an 
increasing  realisation that  the  Logic  of  what  I  call  Orthodox  Keynesianism 
required  an  incomes  policy,  that  is to say,  state  intervention to  control 
the  money  wage  rate.  In  fact  the  logic  of  Orthodox  Keynesianism  is that -4-
a  centrally  controlled  money  price of  Labour  instead of,  for  example, 
a  centrally  controlled  money  price of  gold  is needed  to  form  the 
monetary  anchor  for  the  economy. 
The  final  explosion  came  with  the  rise  in  the  OPEC  price of 
imported oil  in  the  early  1970s.  Any  failure  to  accept  the  fall  in 
the  real  standard of  liwing  represented  by  this  rise  in the price of 
an  important  imported  component  in  the  cost  of  Living  was  bound  to 
cause  an  explosive  inflation.  Wages  rose  to offset  the effect  on  the 
cost  of  Living  of  the  increased price of  imported oil; this  raised  costs 
and  prices still further  so  that  wages  rose still further  which  caused 
a  further  rise  in  costs  and  prices  and  thus  a  threat  of  explosive  inflation 
so  long  as  the  inevitable fall  in  real  income  was  not  accepted. 
The  logic  of  Orthodox  Keynesianism  is to use  the  panoply  of 
financial  policies - fiscal,  monetary,  foreign  exchange  rate - to 
maintain  real  output  and  employment  and  to use  the  money  wage  rate to 
control  the  inflation of  money  prices  and  incomes.  I  do  not  believe 
that  this  can  be  made  to  work  without  excessive  governmental  intervention 
in  the  affairs of  business  at  the ~icro level. 
I  turn  therefore  to  the  advocacy  of  New  Keynesianism,  by  which  I 
mean  the  use  of  the  whole  panoply  of  Keynesian  Demand  Management  financial 
policies for  the  control  of  money  expenditures' but  with  the objective,  not 
of  maintaining  real  output  and  employment,  but  of  maintaining  the 
total  money  expenditures  on  the  products  of  labour  (i.e. the  money  GOP 
or  the  money  national  income)  on  a  steady  moderate  growth  path,  thus 
avoiding  by  Keynesian  measures  total  monetary  inflations or deflations. 
This  would  control  inflation;  but  in  order  to  be  compatible  with  full 
employment  it  would  need  to be  combined  with  a  radical  reform  of  wage-
fixing  arrangements  so  that  rates  of  pay  were  fixed  so  as  to maintain 
real  employment  and  output. 
This,  it  may  be  observed,  is to  use  the  wage  rate  (price of  labour) 
at  the  micro  level  in  the  natural  market  way  to  increase  in  any  sector 
the  demand  for  Labour  where  there  is an  excess  supply  and  vice  versa. 
I  am  not  suggesting  that  this  is  an  easy  reform  in  modern  conditions. -5-
It  involves  dealing  somehow  or  other at  the  micro  Level  with  the 
monopolistic  powers  of  companies,  trade  unions,  and  other  bodies 
so  as  to ensure  that,  where  unemployed  resources exist, an  increase 
in  demand  Leads  to  an  increase  in  output  and  employment  rather  than 
to  an  increase  in prices  and  incomes  for  the  sole  benefit  of  the 
existing owners  and  workers. 
To  tackle this  problem  certainly  requires  a  major  change  in 
institutions  and  attitudes  whereby  much  Less  emphasis  is  put  on  wage 
settlements  as  the  means  of  affecting  the  Levels  and  the distribution 
of  real  incomes,  while  much  more  emphasis  is  put  on  other  measures 
(fiscal,  social  security etc.)  as  the  appropriate  means  for  obtaining 
a  socially acceptable  distribution of  real  income.  All  this  constitutes 
in  my  opinion  much  the  most  difficult  part  of  our  problem  politically 
and  its solution depends  very  much  in  each  country  upon  the  particular 
institutions,  customs,  historical  background,  and  political possibilities 
of  that  country.  Its solution  is essential  for  the  future  welfare  of 
our  type  of  society;  but  I  am  not  going  to discuss  it today. 
What  I  am  going  to discuss are certain aspects  of  the other  Limb 
of  New  Keynesianism,  namely  the  use  of  financial  policies  in  each  country 
for  the  demand  management  purpose of  maintaining  the  total  money  national 
income  of  GDP  (i.e. the  total  of  money  expenditures  on  the  country's 
products)  on  a  steady,  moderate,  planned  growth  path.  This  has,  of  course, 
an  important  feedback  upon  the  wage-fixing  problem.  If  it is  known  that 
the  total  money  national  income  is going  to  rise by  5%  and  no  more, 
then  any  individual  claim  for  a  rise of  more  than  5%  in  pay  must  mean 
that  someone  else  must  get  Less  - either  a  cut  in profit  margins,  or  a 
less  than  5%  rise for  some  other  group,  or  an  increase  in  unemployment. 
Thus  the  public  realisation of  the true possibilities  in  the  economy 
should  be  increased;  and  this  should  help  with  the  reform  of  wage-setting 
procedures.  In  this  respect  to take  the  rate  of  increase  in  the  money 
national  income  as  the  basic objective of  counter-inflationary financial 
policy  is  much  more  sensible  than  to take  a  given  rate of  growth  in  some 
monetary  aggregate.  M
0,M1,M2,etc. to the  man  or  woman  in the  street  in 
the  United  Kingdom  sounds  Like  a  reference  to  a  series of  motor  ways, 
whereas  the  total  money  income  available  for  distribution  is  a  much  more -6-
meaningful  idea.  Moreover,  any  particular M may,  as  experience  has 
shown,  vary  without  a  corresponding  change  in expenditures,  as 
people  change  their preferences  for  one  type  of  financial  asset 
rather  than  another;  and  it is after all  the total of  money  expenditures 
which  one  intends  to  control  indirectly by  controlling  M.  Why  not  then 
put  resources  into  improving  the  statistics of  the  money  GOP  and  watch 
that  directly  rather  than  movements  in  M? 
The  same  sort  of  objection  may  be  raised against  trying  to  control 
the  PSBR  or,  as  I  will  call it, the  budget  balance  as  an  indirect  means 
of  counter  inflation  control.  It  is the total  expenditure  on  goods  and 
services  rather  than  the  public  sector  borrowing  which  is  the  ultimate 
objective  for  control  of  monetary  inflation and  deflation. 
This  is not  to  argue  that  the  budget  balance  should  be  disregarded. 
It  is  in  itself of  great  importance  quite  apart  from  the  control  of  montary 
inflation or  deflation.  A large  budget  deficit, properly  corrected for 
inflation accounting  and  after  adjustment  for  true productive  capital 
expenditures,  means  that  the  state  is  mopping  up  private  savings  and 
using  them  to  finance  current  public  concumption.  The  size of  the  real 
current  budget  balance  is  thus  a  matter  for  Legitimate  concern  in  so  far 
as  it affects the  Long-run  rate  of  growth  in  the  economy  through  its 
effect  upon  the  proportion  of  the national  income  which  is  saved  and 
devoted  to  capital  development  rather  than  to  current  consumption.  This 
is  a  Long-run  structural  concern  which  is quite different  from  any  short-
run  concern  about  the  control  of  inflation.  A structural  maladjustment 
of  the  budget  balance  and  investment  ratio  can  well  persist  in  macro-
economic  equilibrium  conditions  in  which  there  is full  employment  and 
no  threat  of  inflation or  deflation. 
In  a  closed  economy  we  would  then  have  two  major  forms  of  financial 
policy,  namely  monetary  Policy  displaying  itself  in the  form  of  varia-
tions  in  rates  of  i.nterest,  and  budgetary policy displaying  itself  in 
the  form  of  variations  in  government  spending  programmes  or  in rates of 
tax.  Against  these  two  instruments  we  have  to set  two  objectives  of 
macro-economic  policy,  namely  the  maintenance  of  the  money  GOP  on  a  steady 
5%  p.a.  growth  path  and  the  maintenance  of  the budget  balance  at  a  level C 0  R R I  G E N D U M 
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Page  7  <see  overleaf) which  gives  the  desired structural  balance  between  domestit  investment 
and  domestic  consumption. 
In a  closed economy  the general  strategy for  the use  of  these  two 
weapons  for  the attainment  of  these  two  targets is clear and  familiar.  A constraint 
on  the  GDP  can  be  achieved  by  a  more  restrictive budgetary  policy and  by 
tighter monetary  policy;  if, however,  that  results  in too  low  a  relation of 
investment  to  consumption,  the  balance  can  be  put  right  by  an  increase  in tax 
rates  <which  will  Largely  restrict  consumption)  combined  with  a  reduction  in 
interest  rates  <which  will  largely stimulate  investment>. 
Thus  one  can  think  of  the  problem  in  the  way  in which  a  control  engineer 
would  think of it.  One  needs  a  model  of  the  dynamic,  lagged,  interrelationships 
between  the  main  aggregate variables  in the  economy  (consumption,  investment, 
wage  rates, prices, earnings, profits, output,  employment,  tax  rates,  interest 
rates, etc.  etc.)  including equations  which  explain the  formation  of expectations 
about  movements  in  these variables.  One  then  asks  a  control  engineer  to apply 
his or her  mysterious  and  magic  powers  to tell one  what  rules  about  the  setting 
of  rates of  tax  and  rates of  interest  in the  light of past  and  current  events  are 
most  likely to  keep  the  GDP  on  its planned  path  together with  an  acceptable 
budget  balance. 
Designed  in this  way  one  is not  a  priori  linking one  weapon  to one  target 
<e.g.  tax  rate to control  GDP  and  interest  rate to  control  the  budget  balance 
and  investment  ratio>;  one  is designing  the best  possible package  of  tax  rate and 
interest  rate to obtain the  most  desirable package  of  GDP  level  and  investment 
ratio.  The  best  rules  may  turn out  to put  most  stress on  the  GDP  objective  in 
determining  the  tax  rate and  on  the  investment  ratio in determining  the  interest 
rate.  Indeed,  that will  be  the  result  if the  tax  rate  has  a  rather more  general 
effect on  all forms  of expenditure whether  on  consumption  or  investment,  while  the 
interest  rate affects mainly  investment. 
But  there is another very  important  reason  why  this allocation of  weapons 
to targets  may  be  desirable.  It is very  important  to be  able  to nip  in the 
bud  deviations of  the  money  national  income  from  its steady growth  path  because 
monetary  booms  or  slumps  are apt  to feed  on  themselves  in a  vicious  circle due 
to multiplier effects, accelerator effects,  and  price-expectation effects. -7-
which  gives  the  desired  structural  balance  between  domestic 
investment  and  domestic  consumption. 
In  a  closed  economy  the  general  strategy for  the  use  of  these 
two  weapons  for  the  attainment  of  these  two  tarqets  is  clear  and  familiar. 
A constraint  on  the  GDP  can  be  achieved  by  a  more  restrictive  budgetary 
policy  and  by  tighter  monetary  policy;  if, however,  that  results  in  too 
low  a  relation of  investment  to  consumption,  the  balance  can  be  put  right 
by  an  increase  in tax  rates  (which  will  Largely  stimulate  investment). 
Thus  one  can  think  of  the problem  in the  way  in  which  a  control 
engineer  would  think  of  it. One  needs  a  model  of  the  dynamic,  lagged, 
interrelationships  between  the  main  aggregate  variables  in  the  economy 
(consumption,  investment,  wage  rates, pri~es, earnings, profits, output, 
employment,  tax  rates,  interest  rates, etc. etc.)  including  equations 
which  explafn  the  formation  of  expectations  about  movements  in  these 
variables.  One  then  asks  a  control  engineer  to apply  his or  her  mysterious 
and  magic  powers  to tell one  what  rules  about  the  setting of  rates  of 
tax  and  rates  of  interest  in  the  Light  of  past  and  current  events  are  most 
likely to  keep  the  GDP  on  its planned  path  together  with  an  acceptable 
budget  balance. 
Designed  in this  way  one  is not  a  priori  linking one  weapon  to one 
target  (e.g.  tax  rate  to  control  GDP  and  interest  rate  to  control  the 
budget  balance  and  investment  ratio);  one  is designing  the  best  possible 
package  of  tax  rate  and  interest  rate  to obtain the most  desirable  package 
of  GDP  level  and  investment  ratio.  The  best  rules  may  turn out  to put  most 
stress on  the  GDP  objective  in  determining  the  interest  rate.  Indeed,  that 
will  be  the  result  if the  tax  rate  has  a  rather  more  general  effect  on  all 
forms  of  expenditure  whether  on  consumption  or  investment,  while  the 
interest  rate  affects  mainly  investment. 
But  there  is  another  very  important  reason  why  this allocation of 
weapons  to targets  may  be  desirable.  It  is  very  important  to be  able to 
nip  in  the  bud  deviations  of  the  money  national  income  from  its steady 
growth  path  because  monetary  booms  or  slumps  are  apt  to  feed  on  them-
selves  in  a  vicious  circle due  to multiplier effects, accelerator effects, -8-
On  the other  hand  an  imbalance  between  investment  and  consumption 
in  an  otherwise  stable  economy  constitutes a  structural  growth  problem 
which  can  be  tackled  in  a  more  leisurely fashion.  It  is, therefore, 
important  to  use  a  quickly  acting  regulator  to  control  the  GOP  and  to 
rP.gulate  t,he  less  quickly  acting  instruments  to  the  control  of  the  invest-
ment  r.atio.  The  interest  rate  does  probably  work  mainly  on  investment 
expenditures  and  does  that  slowly  and  with  considerable  lag  since it 
involves  revising  investment  plans.  On  the  other  hand  it should  in  my 
opinion  be  possible  to devise  some  forms  of  tax  regulator  which  could 
be  varied  fairly  frequently  and  promptly  and  which  would  have  a  prompt 
effect  upon  expen0itures.  This  consideration  would  strengthen  the  case 
for  relying primarily  on  fiscal  policy  for  the  control  of  the  GDP. 
This  conclusion  is greatly  reinforced  when  one  turns  to  the  con-
sideration of  an  open  economy  on  the  assumption  that  there  is  a  basic 
freedom  of  trade  and  of  capital  movements  between  it and  the  rest  of  the 
world.  We  have  now  three  instruments  of  financial  policy - fiscal,  monetary, 
and  foreign  exchange  rate policies - to attain three objectives - control 
of  GOP,  of  investment  ratio,  and  of  the  balance  of  payments.  A natural 
first  reaction  is to  suggest  that  there  should  be  a  freely  floating 
exchange  rate  regime  in  which  case  the  foreign  exchange  rate  would  auto-
matically  serve  as  the  instrument  to equate  supply  to demand  in  the  foreign 
exchange  market  and  thus  keep  the  balance  of  payments  in balance.  In  one 
sense  that  is  more  or  Less  what  I  am  going  to suggest,  but  subject  to 
some  very  important  provisos. 
The  situation is  fundamentally  complicated  by  the  fact  that  the 
international  flow  of  capital  funds  constitutes  a  very  important  element 
in  the  balance  of  payments  and  that it is very  sensitive to  changes  in 
interest  r.ates.  One  cannot  simply  ignore this  relationship  in  designing 
interest  rates  policies;  and  this  consideration  strongly  reinforces  the 
argument  for  controlling  the  GOP  primarily by  tax  policy  which  does  not 
have  the  same  sensitive effect  upon  the  flow  of  capital  funds  in  the 
balance  of  payments. -9-
Incidentally  before  I  discuss  the policy  implications  of  the 
sensitivity of  international  capital  funds  to national  interest  rates, 
it is worth  noting  that  these effects are  very difficult to  introduce 
effectively  in one's  calculation of  the dynamic  effects of  different 
policy  strategies.  The  effects of  a  change  in  interest yields  in  one 
country  on  financial  flows  in  the  balance  of  payments  must  take  into 
account  the  following  four  elements:  (i)  the once-for-all  substantial 
flows  of  capital  across  the  exchanges  as  both  domestic  and  foreign  holders 
of  wealth  adjust  their portfolio distributions  from  countries  with  Lower 
to  countries  with  higher  rates of yield;  (ii)  the  subsequent  continuous 
flow  of  new  domestic  and  foreign  savings  in  a  higher  ration than  previously 
into the  countries  with  the  higher  yields;  (iii)  the  change  in  the  con-
tinuous  flow  of  dividend  and  interest  payments  across  the  exchanges  in 
respect  of  unchanged  foreign  asset  holdings  on  which  the  yield  has  changed; 
and  <iv)  the  change  in  the  continuous  flow  of  dividend  and  interest  pay-
ments  across  the  exchanges  due  to  changes  in the distribution of  port-
folio  holdings. 
In  addition  to this  complexity of  once-for-all  and  of  continuing 
effects, there  is the  general  difficulty of  modelling  stock-flow  relation-
ships  in the  capital  market.  In  a  recent  book  on  demand  management  117  I 
and  two  colleagues  have  tried out  the effects  in the  United  Kingdom  of  a 
New  Keynesian  Policy  which  consisted  in  using  the  money  wage  rate  to 
maintain  employment  against  the  background  of  financial  policies  designed 
to  keep  the  money  GOP  on  a  steady  growth  path.  But  as  a  result  of  the 
difficulty  in  modelling  money  capital  flows  we  have  not  in that  book 
tried out  the  policy  rules  for  monetary  and  foreign  exchange  rate policies. 
which  I  am  going  to  recommend  today. 
What  we  have  done  is  simply to  assume  (i)  that  the  real  rate  of 
interest  in the  UK  was  kept  constant  and  (ii)  that  the  rate of  foreign 
exchange  was  varied  in  a  manner  designed  to  keep  the  balance of  trade 
on  a  rather arbitrarily selected path.  On  this  basis  we  have  carried 
out  exercises to  see  to  what  extent  a  fiscal  policy designed  to  keep 
the  GOP  on  a  planned  growth  path  together  with  wage  adjustments  designed 
to promote  employment  could  have  successfully maintained  a  high  and  stable 
Level  of  employment  without  a  runaway  inflation  in  the  UK  in  the period -10-
1972-85.  In  brief  we  have  not  considered  the possibility of  using 
monetary  policy  and  variations  in  interest  rates  as  a  means  of  in-
fluencing  domestic  investment  or  the  international  flow  of  capital 
funds.  We  hope,  however,  that  in  spite of  this our  analysis  of  problems 
involved  in  the  use  of  fiscal  policy  and  wage-rate  adjustments  as 
instruments  for  domestic  stabilisation is not  without  some  value. 
To  return  from  this digression,  we  can,  I  think,  confidently  assume 
that  international  capital  flows  are  very  sensitive to  changes  in national 
rates  of  yield  and  that  at  Least  for  a  time,  while  portfolio adjustments 
are  being  made,  a  reduction  in  interest  rates  in  one  country  will  result 
in  a  substantial  outflow of  funds  which  will  put  a  heavy  pressure on 
that  country's  foreign  exchange  rate.  Consider  then  a  country  - 8  for 
'  Britain - which  Lets  its  currency  Sterling freely  float  so  as  to  Look 
after its balance  of  Payments,  which  uses  variations  in  its tax  rate 
successfully  to  keep  its  GOP  on  target,  and  which  keeps  its interest 
rates  Low  (and  its tax  rate  therefore  correspondingly  high)  so  as  to 
maintain  a  high  desired  investment  ratio.  Suppose  the outside  world  to  be 
made  up  of  country  A - A for  America  with  a  Dollar  currency  (please  excuse 
my  Anglo-Saxon  example)  - which  keeps  its  GOP  on  a  reasonable  path  but 
with  a  very  low  tax  rate  and  a  very  high  rate of  interest.  Very  Low  rates 
of  interest  in  8  combined  with  very  high  rates  in  A will  cause  a  heavy 
flow  of  capital  funds  from  B to  A;  with  a  floating  exchange  rate  Sterling 
will  depreciate  and  the  D~ollar appreciate  until  speculators  thi,nk  that 
Sterling  is  so  undervalued  that  it  is  bound  to start appreciating at 
a  rate  which  will  offset  the  higher  interest yield on  Dollar  securities. 
If there  were  a  6%  difference  in  interest  rates  which  was  expected  to 
Last  for  5  years,  Sterling  would  have  to depreciate  by  some  30%  below 
its expected  equilibrium  level.  The  problem  is  complicated  and  intensi-
fied  by  the  time  Lags  in the  adjustment  of  imports  and  exports  to  changes 
in their prices  - the  perverse  effects of  the  well  known  J-curve.  A 30% 
depreciation  of  Sterling  may  at  first  worsen  country  B's  balance  of  trade 
as  the  price of  its  imports  rise, thus  intensifying the  immediate  strain 
on  the  foreign  exchange  rate.  Such  overshooting  of  its exchange  rates 
could  play  havoc  with  country  B's  domestic  policies for  full  employment 
and  price stability. -ll-
For  this  reason  so  long  as  there  are  free  international  capital 
movements  it  is  not  possible  for  country  B to design  its monetary 
policy  and  set  its  interest  rates  in  such  a  way  as  to attain a  desired 
domestic  investment  ratio  regardless  of  monetary  policies  in  the  rest 
of  the  world,  even  though  it allows  free  movements  in  its  foreign 
exchange  rate.  But  this does  not  mean  that  it  has  no  control  over  its 
investment  ratio  provided  that  it is  indifferent  between  investment  at 
home  and  investment  abroad. 
Suppose  country  B by  a  successful  New  Keynesian  combination  of 
fiscal  control  and  wage-setting  institutions  to  be  enjoying  full  em-
ployment  without  excessive  inflation,  but  that  because  of  high  interest 
rates  abroad  it  is  doing  so  with  undesirably  high  interest  rates at  home, 
matched  by  an  undesirably  low  tax  rate  and  an  undesirably  high  budget 
deficit  needed  to offset  the  domestic  deflationary effects of  high 
interest  rates.  Country  B wishes  to maintain  its  GDP  on  its present  growth 
path  but  with  a  higher  tax  r~te and  thus  lower  consumption  expenditures, 
matched  somehow  or  another  by  higher  expenditures  on  capital  development 
at  home  and  abroad.  It  lowers  its interest  rate  moderately;  this gives 
some  stimulus  to  domestic  investment;  it also  causes  some  moderate  de-
preciation  of  Sterling;  after the  perverse  J-curve  has  worked  itself out 
and  the Sterling exchange  rate  has  settled down  to  a  new  equilibrium 
level  which  balances  supplies  and  demands  in  the  foreign  exchange  market, 
there  will  result  an  increase  in country  B's  balance  of  trade  on  a  scale 
which  matches  the  outflow  of  capital  funds  caused  by  the  reduction  in 
the  i.nterest  rate,  so  that  there  is a  cooresponding  increase  in  its 
investment  of  real  resources  abroad,  i.e.  in  its foreign  investment;  the 
rise  in  expenditures  on  its  home  products  due  to  the  increase  in  its 
domestic  investment  and  to  the  increase  in  its foreign  investment  (i.e. 
in  the  excess  of  its exports  over  imports)  means  that  it must  now  raise 
its tax  rates  and  reduce  its budget  deficit  in  order  to prevent  an  un-
desirable  inflation of  its money  GDP.  The  ratio of  total  investment  to 
consumption  will  have  been  raised principally by  a  change  in  the  exchange 
rate  rather  than  by  a  change  in  the  rate of  interest  and  thus  by  an 
increase  in  foreign  investment  rather  than  in domestic  investment,  if 
domestic  investment  is  not  very  sensitive to  the  rate of  interest  while 
international  capital  flows  are  very  sensitive to  the  rate of  i:nterest -12-
and  the  balance  of  trade  is  ultimately sensitive to  changes  in  the 
real  rate  of  foreign  exchange. 
In  the  light  of  this analysis of  the basic  interrelationships 
let  me  enumerate  some  proposed  rules  of  conduct  for  country  B. 
Rule  (1)  It  relies primarily  upon  fiscal  policy,  in  the  form  of  an 
annual  budgetary  review  backed  by  some  tax  regulators  which 
can  be  used  in  between  the  annual  budget  changes,  to maintain 
its money  GDP  on  a  steady  growth  path. 
Rule  (2)  Against  the  background  of  this  steady  growth  of  the  total 
money  demand  for  the  products  of  labour,  it  achieves  a  basic 
reform  of  its wage-fixing  institutions  in  order  to promote 
real  output  and  employment. 
Rule  (3)  It  allows  its foreign  exchange  rate  freely  to float  without 
intervention  other  than  that  which  I  will  describe  under 
Rule  (9)  below. 
Rule  (4)  It  chooses  and  announces  a  central  target  exchange  rate 
between  Sterling  and  Dollars  at  bWb  where  Wb  is the  value  in 
aW a 
Sterling of  an  hours'  work  in  country  B and  W  is the  value  in  a 
Dollars  of an  hours'  work  in  country  A and  a  and  bare shift 
parameters  of  which  I  will  speak  under  Rule  (8). 
Rule  (5)  The  central  target  exchange  rate  is announced  weekly  after 
revision  in  the  Light  of  movements  in  Wa  and  Wb.  Thus  there 
is, so  far  as  differences  in  inflation rates  are  concerned, 
no  element  of  cumulative  disequilibrium ending  inevitably  with 
a  catalysmic  change  in  a  rigid adjustable  peg  such  as  delights 
the  heart  of  the  speculator,  but  rather  a  steady  weekly  crawling 
peg  offsetting  the  inflationary divergences  of  national  policies. 
Rule  (6)  The  authorities  in  country  B  announce  a  zone  or  band  around  this 
central  target  exchange  rate  with  upper  and  lower  limits of 
+  x%  from  the  central  rate.  At  the  one  extreme,  as  proposed -13-
by  Professor  Williamson  L~7, one  might  have  a  soft  zone  with 
variations  of  !10%  about  the  central  rate,  which  would  mean 
merely  that  the authorities  hoped  to  keep  the  exchange  rate 
within  this  wide  zone.  At  the other  extreme  one  might  have 
a  ard  and  with  variations of  !2%  which  meant  that  the 
authorities  in  fact  undertook  to  keep  the  rate  within  these 
narrow  Limits.  The  choice  is, of  course,  of  basic  importance; 
but  I  do  not  intend to discuss  it today  beyond  saying  that  my 
personal  inclination  would  be  to start  with  a  rather  soft  ~one 
with  wide  variations  and  to  harden  and  narrow  it up  perhaps  as 
experience  might  suggest. 
Rule  (7)  The  authorities  would  use  monetary  policy  with  its effect  on 
interest  rates  and  so  on  capital  flows  in the  balance of  pay- · 
ments  to  keep  the  foreign  exchange  rate  within  the  stated zone 
or  band. 
Rule  (8)  In  the  weekly  revision of  the  central  target  exchange  ~ate  con-
sideration  would  be  given  to  making  moderate  small  changes  in 
the  shift  parameters~ and~- A rise  in  Wb  represents  a  rise 
in  the  price of  labour;  a  rise  in Q_may  be  thought  of  as  a 
fall  in  the  "quality"  of  labour,  so  that  bWb  measures  the price 
of  a  unit  of  a  given  amount  of  "labour efficiency".  A rise  in 
~~~ might,  therefore,  be  appropriate  if the productivity of 
labour  were  rising  less  rapidly  in  country  A than  in  country  B. 
This  is not,  however,  certain.  If productivity  is  rising  more 
quickly  in  A than  in  B,  selling prices  will  presumably  be  rising 
less  rapidly  in  relation to  wage  rates  in  A than  they  are  in  B. 
The  substitution of  A's  products  for  B's  products  in  world  markets 
would  then  tend  to put  a  pressure  on  B's  balance of  trade.  But 
at  the  same  time  if successful  full  employment  policies are  car-
ried out  in  A and  B,  total  real  income  and  thus  the  total demand 
for  imports  will  be  rising  more  rapidly  in  A than  in  B which 
will  put  a  pressure  on  A's  balance  of  trade.  It  is not  at  all 
certain  whether  the  substitution effect  which  is adverse  to  B's 
balance  of  trade  will  be  the  stronger.  It  is  for  this  reason 
that  I  have  chosen  to  relate the c.entral target  exchange  rates - 14-
to  money  wages  rather  than  to  money  wage  costs  or  to  the  money 
price per  unit  of  tradeable output,  though  there  are  no 
doubt  arguments  in  favour  of  the  latter procedures. 
In  any  case  there  is  another  and  more  basic  criterion on 
which  adjustments  of  the  shift  parameters~ and£ must  be 
judged;  and  if this  criterion is observed,  any  maladjustments 
due  to the  choice  of  money  wage  rates  as  the  index  of  monetary 
inflation will  automatically  be  ultimately  corrected.  Suppose 
country  A to  be  running  an  undesirabLy  high  budg,et  deficit 
and  Low  investment  ratio.  On  the basis  of  my  previous  analysis 
it needs  to depreciate  its  real  exchange  in order  to promote 
a  surplus  on  its  balance  of  trade  and  thus  its foreign  invest-
ment.  It  needs  a  movement  in  the  terms  of  trade against  its 
products  to  expand  their sales;  and  this  requires  its  Labour  to 
be  regarded  as  "cheaper"  relative to  country  A's  labour;  and 
this  can  be  achieved  by  a  rise  in  the  ratio  Q/~.  Changes  in  these 
shift  parameters  ultimately affect  the  real  terms  of  trade  and 
are  thus  the  means  for  achieving  a  gradual  structural  adjustment 
of  the  budget  balance  and  investment  ratio. 
Rule  (9)  The  basic  foreign  exchange  regime  would  thus  be  freely  floating 
exchange  rates  influenced  by  monetary  policy  designed  to achieve 
appropriate  adjustments  in  interest  rates  and  so  in  capital  flows. 
But  because  of  the  perverse effects of  the  downward  slope  of 
the  notorious  J-curve  the  immediate,  but  temporary  effects of 
a  rise  in  21~ might  be  to  reduce  instead of  to  increase  the 
country's  balance  of  trade.  In  order  to prevent  the  perverse 
rise  in  interest  rates  which  might  then  otherwise  be  needed  to 
attract  foreign  funds  so  as  to  keep  the  exchange  rate  within  its 
zone  or  band,  there  would  be  a  clear  case  for  temporary  support 
of  the  foreign  exchange  rate  by  the  use  of  off~cial  foreign 
exchang-e  reserves  to  tide over  the  period  untiL  the depreciation 
had  its effect  in  increasing  the  balance  of  trade.  The  freely 
floating  exchange  regime  should  properly  be  modified  by  inter-
ventions  needed  to offset  the  temporary  perverse effects of  the 
J-curve.  This  is  not  an  argument  for  official  intervention to 
smooth  out  exchange  rate  variations  which  are  permanently  needed -15-
to preserve  equilibrium  in  view  of  changed  conditions.  It 
is  not  an  argument  in  favour  of  "Leaning  against  the  wind"; 
it is  an  argument  in  favour  of  preventing  temporary  per-
verse  overshooting  of  needed  exchange  rate  change. 
So  much  for  the  rules  of  action  for  one  small  country  acting  alone. 
I  turn  now  to the  other  extreme  and  ask  what  the  rules  would  Look  Like 
if all the  free-enterprise  countries of  the  world  joined together  in  a 
community  to attempt  to  apply  these  principles  jointly. 
I  start  with  a  short  statement  of  what  I  believe  are  the  main 
desiderata of  such  international  co-operation.  I  do  not  put  much,  if 
any,  weight  on  harmonising  the  rates of  inflation of  money  prices,  money 
costs,  and  money  incomes  in  the  various  countries.  If  the  crawling  peg 
principle of  weekly  changes  in  the  w•s  and  similar  components  of  tentral 
target  exchange  rates  is adopted,  there  is  Little or  no  cost  in divergences 
in  actual  inflation  rates;  and  the  extra degree  of  freedom  for  national 
governments  may  make  it easier  for  them  to  maintain  a  high  and  stable 
Level  of  real  output  and  employment. 
Maintenance  of  such  a  high  level  or  real  economic  activity by  methods 
which  do  not  beggar  my  neighbour  is  what  really matters.  This  is strikingly 
illustrated by  one  of  the  main  exercises  which  my  colleagues  and  I  carried 
out  in  our  book  on  demand  management  L11.  We  asked  what  would  happen  if 
during  the  period  1972-85  the  United  Kingdom  had  by  the  use  of  fiscal 
policy  and  wage-setting  reforms  maintained  full  employment  on  the  Lines 
which  I  have  discussed  above  for  country  B in  spite of  the great  world 
recession  with  its  inevitable  reduction  in  the  real  demand  for  United 
Kingdom  products.  The  answer  is that  employment  might  have  been  main-
tained  but  only  at  the  expense  of  a  large  strain on  foreign  exchange 
reserves  and  of  a  corresponding  huge  increase  in  the national  debt  as 
relaxed  fiscal  policy  was  needed  to maintain  economic  activity  while  the 
foreign  demand  for  United  Kingdom  products  was  severely depressed,  until 
after  the  end  of  the  perverse  J-curve  period  when  a  reduction  in  the 
United  Kingdom  real  exchange  rate  had  managed  to  restore  her  balance of 
trade  in  spite of  the  maintenance  of  her  real  demand  for  imports  when 
the  world
1s  real  demand  for  her  exports  had  fallen. -16-
In  view  of  these  desiderata the  rules  for  our  Community  of  Nations 
might  be  as  follows. 
Rules  (1)  Each  country  would  be  free  to design  its own  fiscal  policy 
and  (2)  ------- and  wage  setting  arrangements  so  as  to  achieve  by  these 
domestic  measures  a  high  and  stable  Level  of  employment  and 
real  output.  Personally  I  would  advise  them  to do  it by  New 
Keynesian  rather  than  Orthodox  Keynesian  means;  and  no  doubt 
rliscussion  and  exchange  of  information  on  these  methods  would 
be  helpful.  But  what  really matters  is the  achievement  of  full 
employment  by  these  innocuous  domestic  measures. 
Rule  (3)  There  would  be  a  basic  freely  floating  foreign  exchange  regime. 
Rule  (4)  The  member  countries  would  co-operate  in  setting a consistent 
structure of  entral  target  exchange  rates.  If the  currency 
of  country  A (e.g.  America's  Dollar)  were  taken  for  the  numeraire 
these  could  be  expressed  as 
cW c 
aw' 
~ 
etc. 
where  b,  c,  d, etc.  stood  for  the  currencies of  other  member 
countries. 
The  same  result  could  be  achieved  by  expressing  the  rates  in 
terms  of  a  Community  Currency  Unit  (CCU).  Suppose  one  CCU  to 
consist  of  A units  of  currency  A,  plus  B units of  currency  B, 
plus  C units  of  currency  C etc.  Then  if a  consistent  structure 
bW  cW  of  target  exchange  rates ___  b, ___  c,  etc  were  observed,  the 
aw  aw  a  a 
value  in  s•s  currency  of  one  CCU  would  be 
bwb[s.  +  A  +  c  +  etc.J  = bw  Q 
~  awa  ewe  b 
where  Q measures  the  total  amount  of  "effective  labour"  which 
one  CCU  can  command  at  any  time  throughout  the  community. 
The  central  target  exchange  rate  for  country  B1s  Sterling  would 
B  be  expressed  as  bWb  Q for  one  CCU;  and  bWIQ  would  measure  the 
b -17-
proportional  real  weight  of  Sterling  in  the  composition  of 
a  CCU. 
Rule  (5)  The  Community  would  revise  and  announce  weekly  the  central 
target  exchange  rates  in  view  of  changes  in the  W's. 
Rule  (6)  The  Community  would  announce  given  zones  or bands  for  the 
exchange  rates  with  a  given  degree  of  variation between  the 
upper  and  lower  limits. 
Rule  (7)  The  Community  would  co-operate  continuously in national  monetary 
policies  so  as  to  set  a  structure of  national  domestic  interest 
rates  which  satisfied two  conditions.  First, the  rates of  interest 
relatively to each  other  would  be  adjusted  so  as  to maintain 
foreign  exchange  rates  within  the  agreed  zones  or  bands.  Secondly, 
the  whole  structure of  rates  of  interest  would  be  revised  down-
wards  if throughout  the  Community  it  was  found  that  excessive 
budget  deficits  would  otherwise  be  needed  in order  to offset 
the  deflationary effects on  the  money  GOP  of  high  interest 
rates. 
It  is  in  this  second  requirement  that  the  Community  rules  would 
differ  from  the  single  country  rules.  In  the  case  of  a  single 
country  which  found  that  it  was  having  to  run  an  undesirably 
high  budget  deficit  and  low  investment  ratio  in order  to prevent 
a  deflation  of  its money  GOP,  the  rule  would  be  that  it should 
depreciate  its real  exchange  rate  in order  to  improve  its 
balance  of  trade  and  so  its foreign  investment.  Clearly  it 
would  not  make  sense  to say that  every  country  should  simulta-
neously  depreciate  its real  exchange  rate  in  terms  of  every 
other  currency  so  that  every  country  should  improve  its balance 
of  trade  with  every  other  country.  What  is needed  in  these 
circumstances  is a  simultaneous  reduction  in interest  rates  in 
all  countries  in  order  to  stimulate domestic  investment  in 
all the  countries. -18-
Rule  (8)  However,  if only  one  country  or  a  Limited  number  of  countries 
were  experiencing  undesirably  high  budget  deficits  as  a  result 
of  the  use  of  fiscal  policy to prevent  a  deflation of  their 
money  GDPs,  then  a  depreciation of  the  real  exchange  rates  of 
this  group  of  countries  in  terms  of  the  currencies of  the  rest 
of  the  Community  is_the  appropriate  reaction;  and  this  requires 
a  rise  in  the  shift  parameters  of  the  former  group  on  the  grounds 
which  I  have  discussed  at  length  for  the  single-country  case. 
Rule  (9)  There  remains  the  problem  of  official  intervention  in  foreign 
exchange  markets.  The  ideal  arrangement  would  be  that  the 
national  monetary  authorities  should  abstain  from  all  interven-
tion,  but  that  there  should  be  some  joint  Community  body  which 
intervened  when  a  temporary  perverse  movement  or overshooting 
of  exchange  rates  was  otherwise  likely to occur.  The  outstanding 
example  of  such  a  case  would  be  where  a  change  in  structural  real 
exchange  rates  had  been  made  on  the  principles  just  described 
in  Rule  (8),  in  order  to  expand  the  balance  of  trade of  one  set 
of  countries  with  excess  budget  deficits at  the  expense  of  the 
balance  of  trade  of  another  set  of  countries  with  excess  budget 
surpluses;  the  temporary  perverse effect  of  such  a  change  in 
exchange  rates  on  balances  of  trade  could  be  offset  by  the  use 
of official  exchange  interventions  to the  advantage  of  both 
parties  concerned. 
Finally one  may  consider  what  would  be  the  sensible  rates  for 
a  group  of  countries  which  wished  to  form  a  community  of  lhis 
kind  but  which  could  not  enlist  the  membership  of  all  other 
free-enterprise  countries.  The  relations  between  the  members 
would  be  on  the  pattern  which  I  have  just outlined for  community 
behaviour,  but  the  relations  between  the  members  as  a  group  and 
the  outside  world  would  have  to  be  on  the  single-country pattern. 
The  rules  might  be  as  follows. - 19-
Rules  (1)  The  member  countries  would  undertake  to  rely  on  fiscal  policy 
and  (2)  and  wage-setting  as  their domestic  weapons  for  maintaining 
a  high  and  stable  level  of  real  economic  activity without  a 
runaway  inflation.  It  would  be  desirable  though  not  essential 
that  they  should  agree  to do  this on  New  Keynesian  principles 
which  would  involve  each  member  country  in announcing  a 
target  path  for  the  growth  of  its money  national  i.ncome  or  GOP. 
Rule  (3)  The  member  countries  would  agree  to  rely basically on  a  regime 
of  freely  floating  foreign  exchange  rates. 
Rule  (4)  They  would  agree  on  a  set  of  central target exchange  rates 
for  each  country's  currency  in  terms  of  a  Community  Currency 
Unit  on  the  lines described  under  Rule  (4)  in the  full  community 
case.  Thus  the  Sterling/CCU  rate  would  be  set at  bWbQ  where 
Q =  8  + 
bWb 
c 
cW c 
+ etc 
and  B,  C,  etc.  were  the  amounts  of  the  currencies  of  the 
member  countries  which  were  included  in the  CCU. 
They  would  also  agree  on  a  central target  rate for  the  exchange 
between  the  CCU  and  outside  currencies  which  would  presumably 
be  represented  by  the  Dollar.  Such  a  rate  could  be  expressed 
as  one  CCU  =  aW  Q,  since  Q would  measure  the total  amount  of 
a 
"effective  labour"  which  one  CCU  would  command  in  the  Community 
while  1/aW  would  measure  the  amount  of "effective  labouru  a 
which  one  Dollar  would  command  in  country  A. 
Rule  (5)  These  rates of  exchange  would  all be  announced  and  revised 
weekly  in  view  of  changes  in the  W's. 
Rule  (6)  The  Community  would  decide  on  ~ones or  ~ands with  upper  and 
lower  limits  for  these  ~ates of exchange. -20-
Rule  (7)  The  Community  would continuously review  the  monetary  and 
interest  rate  policies  of  the  members  so  as  to achieve  a 
structure of  yields  in  the  various  member  countries  wich 
satisfied two  conditions;  - first, that  the  rates  of  interest 
relative to  each  other  were  such  as  to  keep  the  rate  of  exchange 
of  each  member's  currency  in  terms  of  the  CCU  within  the  agreed 
zone  or  band;  and,  second,  that  the  absolute  Level  of  the  whole 
structure of  Community  rates  was  raised or  Lowered  so  as  to 
keep  the  CCU/Dollar  rate  within  the  agreed zone  9r band. 
Rule  (8)  If  one  member  country  had  to  incur  an  unduly  Large  tudget deficit 
as  a  result  of  fiscal  policy designed  to prevent  a  fall  in  its 
money  GOP,  then  its shift  parameter  in  the determination  of  its 
central target  ~xchange rate on  the  CCU  would  be  raised.  If, on 
the  other  hand,  all  the  members  of  the  CCU  were  simultaneously 
experiencing  unduly  Large  budget  deficits  as  a  result  of  fiscal 
policies  designed  to  maintain  their  money  GDPs,  then  the  shift 
parameter~ in  the  CCU/Dollar  rate  would  be  Lowered. 
Rule  (9)  ALL  actual  interventions  in  the  foreign  exchange  markets  to 
offset  perverse  J-curve  effects  would  be  carried out  by  a  joint 
Community  pool  of  currencies  or  other  forms  of official finance. 
To  summarise,  each  member  country  would  be  free  to devise  its own 
fiscal  and  wage  setting policies  and  institutions so  as  to maintain 
economic  activity without  runaway  inflation, but  there  would  be  a  very 
extensive  pooling  of  sovereignty  in  the  case  of  monetary  policy,  foreign 
exchange  rates,  and  official  intervention.  Central  target  exchange  rates 
would  be  agreed  and  continuously  adjusted  in  a  crawl  to offset  differences 
in  rates  of  domestic  inflation.  National  monetary  policies  would  be  jointly 
managed  with  the object  of  keeping  these  exchange  rates  within  certain 
predetermined  zones  or !J.ands.  The  real  central target rates of exchange 
would  be  jointly adjusted  so  as  to  relieve  members  of  any  undesirably 
Large  budget  deficits or surplusses  which  might  result  from  their domestic 
use  of  fiscal  policy  for  the  maintenance  of  domestic  equilibrium. -21-
Finally,  all official  interventions  in  foreign  exchange  markets 
would  be  undertaken  by  a  Community  authority  for  the  purpose  of  avoiding 
temporary  perverse  movements  in  the  members'  balances  of  international 
payments. 
That  is  how  I  personally  would  Like  to  see  the  EMS  develop. 
References 
{1.7  David  Vines,  Jan  Maciejewski,  and  J.E.  Meade.  "Stagflation  Volume  2, 
Demand  Management".  Allen  and  Unwin,  London  1983,  produced  with 
the  support  of  a  grant  from  the  Social  Science  Research  Council. 
L~7  John  Williamson.  "The  Exchange  Rate  System"  Institute for  Inter-
national  Economics,  Washington  D.C.  1983. Economic  P~ers 
The  following  papers  have  been  issued.  Copies  may  be  obtained 
by  applying  to  the  address  mentioned  on  the  inside  front  cover. 
No.  1 
No.  3 
No.  4 
No.  5 
No.  6 
No.  7 
No.  8 
No.  9 
No.  10 
No.  11 
No.  12 
No.  13 
eec-DG  II  i"fLationery  tMotctet1ons. 
expectations  for  the  EEC  countries,  by  F.  Papadia  and  V.  Basano 
<May  1981). 
A review  of  the  informal  economy  in  the  European  Commu_nity,  by 
Adrian  Smith  (July  1981). 
Problems  of  interdependence  in  a  multipolar  world,  by 
Tommaso  Padoa-Schioppa  (August  1983). 
European  Dimensions  in  the  Adjustment  Problems,  by  Michael  Emerson 
<August  1981). 
The  bilateral  trade  linkages  of  the  Eurolink  Model  :  An  analysis 
of  foreign  trade  and  competitiveness,  by  P.  Ranuzzi  (January  1982). 
United  Kingdom,  Medium  term  economic  trends  and  problems,  by 
D.  Adams,  S.  Gillespie,  M.  Green  and  H.  Wortmann  (February  1982>. 
Ou  en  est  La  theorie  macroeconomique,  par  E.  Malinvaud  (juin  1982). 
Marginal  Employment  Subsidies  :  An  Effective  Policy  to  Generate 
Employment,  by  Carl  Chiarella  and  Alfred  Steinherr  (November  1982). 
The  Great  Depression  :  A Repeat  in  the  1980s  ?,  by  Alfred  Steinherr 
(November  1982). 
Evolution  et  problemes  structurels  de  l'economie  neerLandaise, 
par  D.C.  Breedveld,  C.  Depoortere,  A.  Finetti,  Dr.  J.M.G.  Pieters 
et  C.  Vanbelle  (mars  1983). 
Macroeconomic  prospects  and  policies  for  the  European  Community, 
by  Giorgio  Basevi,  Olivier Blanchard,  Willem  Suiter, 
Rudiger  Dornbusch  and  Richard  Layard  (April  1983). 
The  supply  of  output  equations  in  the  EC-countries  and  the  use  of 
the  survey-based  inflationary expectations,  by  Paul  De  Grauwe  and 
Mustapha  Nabli  (May  1983). No.  14  Structural  trends  of  financial  systems  and  capital  accumulation 
France,  Germany,  Italy,  by  G.  Nardozzi  (May  1983). 
No.  15  Monetary  assets  and  inflation  induced distortions  of  the  national 
accounts  - conceptual  issues  and  correction of  sectoral  income  flows 
in  5  EEC  countries,  by  Alex  Cukierman  and  Jorgen  Mortensen  (May  1983). 
No.  16  Feder·aL  Republic  of  Germany.  Medium-ter-m  economic  trends  and 
problems,  by  F.  Allgayer,  s.  Gillespie,  M.  Green  and  H.  wortma~n 
(June  1983). 
No.  17  The  employment  miracle  in  the  US  and  stagnation  employment  in 
the  EC,  by  M.  Wegner  (July  1983). 
No.  18  Productive  Performance  in  West  German  Manufacturing  Industry 
1970-1980;  A Farrell  Frontier  Characterisation,  by  D.  Todd 
(August  1983). 
No.  19  Central-Bank  Policy  and  the  Financing  of  Government  Budget  De~icits 
A Cross-Country  Comparison,  by  G.  Demopoulos,  G.  Katsimbris  and 
S.  Miller  (September  1983). 
No.  20  Monetary  assets  and  inflation  induced distortions of  th~  ~ationaL 
accounts.  The  case  of  Belgium,  by  Ken  Lennan  <October  1983). 
No.  21  Actifs  financiers  et  distorsions  des  flux  sectoriels dues  b 
l'inflation  :  Le  cas  de  La  France,  par  J.-P.  Bach~  (octobr~ 
1 9~3). 
No.  22  Approche  pragmatique  pour  une  politique de  plein  emploi  :  Les 
subventions a  La  creation d'emplois,  par  A.  Steinherr et 
B.  Van  Haeperen  (octobre  1983). 
No.  23  Income  Distribution  and  Employment  in  the  European  Commuri~ies 
1960- 1982,  by  A.  Steinherr  (December  1983). 
No.  24  U.S.  ~ficits, the dollar  and  Europe,  by  0.  Blanchard  and 
R.  Dornbusch  (December  1983). 
No.  25  Monetary  assets  and  inflation  induced  distortions  of  the  national 
accounts.  The  case  of  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  by 
H.  Wittelsberger  (January  1984). 
No.  26  Actifs  financiers  et  distorsions  des  flux  sectoriels dues  a 
l'inflation:  le  cas  de  l'Italie, par  A.  Reati  (janvier  1984). 
No.  27  Evolution et  problemes  strucurels  de  l'~conomie italienne,  par 
Q.  Ciardelli,  F.  Colasanti  et  X.  Lannes  (janvier  1984). 
No.  28  International  Co-operation  in  Macro-economic  Policies,  by 
J.E.  Meade  (February  1984>. 